Hedonism by Tilley, John J.
p. 1 
HEDONISM 
JOHN J. TILLEY 
INDIANA UNIVERSITY–PURDUE UNIVERSITY INDIANAPOLIS (IUPUI) 
jtilley@iupui.edu 
 
[Final (or penultimate?) draft of an article that appeared in the Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics, 2nd ed., 
ed. Ruth Chadwick (San Diego: Academic Press, 2012), vol. 2: 566–73.] 
 
 
I.  Ancient Hedonism 
II.  Ethical Hedonism 
III.  Axiological Hedonism  
IV.  Psychological Hedonism 





ancient hedonism  A term for the normative views of the Cyrenaic and Epicurean philosophers. 
The Cyrenaics flourished in the fourth century B.C.; the Epicureans in the two centuries 
following that one. Both groups prescribed pleasure as the goal of life, but they held different 
views about the essence of pleasure and about the best way to obtain it. 
axiological hedonism  A theory of intrinsic value, with two core components: first, all pleasure 
is intrinsically good; and second, nothing but pleasure is intrinsically good. 
ethical hedonism  The thesis that the moral rightness of an act derives from the pleasure the act 
produces. It comes in two main versions: hedonistic ethical egoism; and hedonistic act 
utilitarianism.  
extrinsic value  Such value is possessed by a thing owing to its relations to other things of value. 
For instance, a thing has extrinsic value if it results in, or is a means to, something else of 
value. Unlike intrinsic value, extrinsic value vanishes if the thing in which it resides is 
viewed in total abstraction from everything else. (Here and elsewhere, “thing” has its 
broadest meaning. It extends not only to tables and chairs, but also to pleasure, pain, 
knowledge, justice, and so forth.) 
intrinsic value  The value a thing possesses insofar as it is valuable in itself, taken in abstraction 
from everything else, including its effects, its accompaniments, and the ends it promotes. 
Intrinsic value contrasts with extrinsic value, but the two do not exclude each other. A single 
thing can have both kinds of value.  
nonhedonists  Those who reject hedonism. The term usually stands for those who reject 
axiological hedonism. Some of the latter are monists: they think there is a single intrinsic 
good, a good that is not pleasure. Others are pluralists: they think there are two or more 
intrinsic goods, at least one of which is not pleasure. Possible intrinsic goods include (in 
addition to pleasure) life, justice, beauty, and knowledge. Some prominent nonhedonists are 
Plato (428–348 B.C.), Aristotle (384–322 B.C.), Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), T. H. Green 
(1836–1882), F. H. Bradley (1846–1924), and G. E. Moore (1873–1958).  
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psychological egoism  The view that human beings are so constituted that every purposive 
human act ultimately derives from self-interest. Whenever a person acts, her ultimate aim is 
only to promote her own survival, or her own pleasure, etc.  
psychological hedonism  A version of psychological egoism. It asserts that every purposive 
human act ultimately springs from the agent’s desire for pleasure—specifically, his own 
pleasure. 
qualitative hedonism  A form of axiological hedonism according to which the intrinsic value of 
a pleasure increases with the quantity and quality of the pleasure, not merely with its quantity 
alone. 
quantitative hedonism  A form of axiological hedonism according to which the intrinsic value 




HEDONISM derives its name from the Greek word “hedone,” meaning pleasure. It comes in 
three major versions: axiological hedonism, according to which pleasure is the only thing of 
intrinsic value; psychological hedonism, according to which every purposive act derives 
ultimately from the desire for pleasure; and ethical hedonism, according to which the moral 
rightness of an act is a function of the pleasure the act produces. Each version has distinguished 
proponents. For example, all three versions were held by Aristippus (435–356 B.C.), Epicurus 
(342–270 B.C.), Claude-Adrien Helvétius (1715–1771), Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), and John 
Stuart Mill (1806–1873). For reasons stated in Section II, this article touches only briefly on 
ethical hedonism; it concentrates on axiological hedonism and psychological hedonism. It 
begins, however, with a few words about hedonism in ancient times.  
 
I. ANCIENT HEDONISM 
 
The term “ancient hedonism” refers to the normative views of the Cyrenaic and Epicurean 
schools of philosophy. The Cyrenaics flourished in the fourth century B.C.; the Epicureans in the 
two centuries following that one. The members of these schools not only accepted axiological, 
psychological, and ethical hedonism, but held detailed views about the best way to achieve a 
pleasurable life. The Cyrenaics were followers of Aristippus, a student of Socrates who broke 
with his teacher’s philosophy to establish his own school in Cyrene, on the coast of North Africa. 
The Cyrenaics not only prescribed pleasure as the goal of life, but recommended intense, 
physical, immediate pleasures as those especially worthy of pursuit. (There were exceptions, 
however. One of them was Hegesias, who stressed the avoidance of pain rather than the active 
pursuit of pleasure.)  
The Epicurean school, founded by Epicurus in Athens, identified pleasure with peace of 
mind and freedom from physical pain; it also held that the Cyrenaic mode of life was not the best 
way to obtain pleasure. The Epicureans recommended moderation, rational self-control, and the 
avoidance of all vain (as opposed to natural) pleasures, especially those likely bring pain or the 
loss of mental tranquility. They recommended these things not as an alternative to seeking 
pleasure, but as the best way to achieve a genuinely pleasant life. Clearly, the Epicureans were 
not “epicureans” in the modern sense. Their lives tended toward the ascetic, not toward pleasure 
seeking as we usually conceive it. 
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II. ETHICAL HEDONISM 
 
According to ethical hedonism, whether an act is morally right is a function of the pleasure the 
act produces (where the function is such that morally right actions ultimately promote, rather 
than diminish, pleasure). This thesis comes in different forms, depending on how the function is 
specified and on whose pleasure is relevant. The most common forms are hedonistic ethical 
egoism, according to which an act is right if and only if it produces at least as much pleasure for 
the agent who performs it as any other act available to him; and hedonistic act utilitarianism, 
according to which an act is right if and only if it produces at least as much pleasure—never 
mind whose pleasure, just pleasure, period—as anything else the agent could do instead.  
The first of these views has far fewer adherents than the second. To many it seems obvious 
that what is morally right is not always the same as what maximizes personal pleasure. The 
second of the two views, hedonistic act utilitarianism, is a serious contender among moral 
theories. In this article, however, it will receive no further discussion. This is because utilitarian-
ism receives attention elsewhere in this encyclopedia and because in recent decades the word 
“hedonism” has served mainly as a label for psychological hedonism and axiological hedonism.   
 
III. AXIOLOGICAL HEDONISM 
 
A. The Components of Axiological Hedonism 
 
Axiological hedonism is not a theory about what makes an act right or wrong, although it figures 
centrally in many such theories. It is a theory about intrinsic value, with two main components: 
 
(1) Every pleasure has intrinsic value.  
 
(2) Nothing but pleasure has intrinsic value. 
 
The word “pleasure” has a broad meaning here; it includes the absence of pain.  
Many axiological hedonists, those called quantitative hedonists (e.g., Bentham), add a third 
component:  
 
(3) The greater the quantity of pleasure, the greater the intrinsic value of the pleasure. 
More precisely, the intrinsic value of a pleasure varies directly, and solely, with the 
quantity of pleasure. 
 
However, other axiological hedonists (e.g., J. S. Mill) reject (3), maintaining that intrinsic value 
increases according to the quantity and quality of the pleasure, not according to its quantity 
alone. These hedonists are called qualitative hedonists.  
A thing has intrinsic value just in case it is valuable in itself, taken in abstraction from 
everything else, including its results, its accompaniments, and the ends it promotes. Money has 
value, but its value is extrinsic rather than intrinsic. It has no value in itself, taken in abstraction 
from the things we can buy with it and from the satisfaction many receive from acquiring it. In 
fact, most things of value have only extrinsic value—this is an uncontentious claim that few 
would deny. Axiological hedonists go a step further and contend that only one thing, namely 
pleasure, has intrinsic value. They add to this that all pleasures have intrinsic value, including, 
say, sadistic ones. No doubt sadistic pleasures are normally bad, for they contribute to deeds that 
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are pleasure-diminishing for one or more people. But this simply means that they are bad 
extrinsically; it does not refute the claim that they are good in themselves, taken in abstraction 
from everything else. A pleasure can be extrinsically bad while also being intrinsically good.  
 
B. Common Mistakes about Axiological Hedonism 
 
We must avoid five common errors about axiological hedonism. The first is that of assuming, 
rather than arguing, that axiological hedonism is about happiness—that is, that it asserts that 
happiness alone has intrinsic value. The latter thesis is the same as axiological hedonism only if 
happiness is the same as pleasure. Many philosophers argue that the two are not the same. For 
instance, pigeons no doubt feel pleasure, but they most likely do not experience happiness. 
Happiness would seem to require cognitive capacities of a sophisticated sort, capacities that 
pigeons are unlikely to have. Pleasure, on the other hand, can be experienced by any creature 
capable of having pleasant physical sensations.  
However, this is not to say that “pleasure” refers merely to such sensations. Many 
philosophers, including many axiological hedonists, would argue that it extends also to pleasant 
experiences or to the hedonic tone—the pleasantness—of such experiences, where neither the 
experiences nor their pleasantness can be reduced entirely to physical sensations. Also, 
axiological hedonists treat the absence of pain as a form or component of pleasure. They do so 
by stretching the word “pleasure” just enough to include the absence of pain. In their view this is 
only a slight stretch, because pain is the opposite of pleasure, just as east is the opposite of west.  
The second error consists of assuming that axiological hedonism is our sole option if we 
have a scientific outlook—that is, that any other view of intrinsic value is unscientific or 
unempirical. The view that desire-satisfaction has intrinsic value fits well with a scientific 
outlook (partly because desires have a place in the explanatory apparatus of some social 
sciences), but it conflicts with axiological hedonism. To satisfy a desire is simply to bring about 
the state of affairs the desire has as its object. Often, but not always, the satisfaction of the desire 
produces pleasure, but even when it does it is not identical to pleasure. Hence, the thesis that 
desire-satisfaction is intrinsically good differs from the thesis that pleasure is intrinsically good.  
The general point here is that a person can have a scientific outlook while holding a nonhedon-
istic theory of intrinsic value. 
The third error is that of charging axiological hedonists with the view that our chief aim 
should be to produce pleasure. The claim that pleasure alone has intrinsic value entails no 
position about what our chief aims should be. Even if we assume that our aims should be tailored 
to bring pleasure into the world, axiological hedonism does not imply that we should make the 
production of pleasure our chief aim. Perhaps the best way to bring pleasure into the world is to 
put pleasure out of our minds and strive directly for such things as peace, knowledge, and 
friendship. This view is compatible with axiological hedonism.  
The fourth error is that of thinking that axiological hedonism is about the sources of 
pleasure. According to axiological hedonists, it is not the sources of pleasure—the sip of cognac, 
the weekend at the beach, and so on—that have intrinsic value. Rather, it is pleasure alone, 
whatever its source, that has such value.  
The fifth error consists of thinking that according to axiological hedonism, nothing but 
pleasure has value. Axiological hedonists grant that many things besides pleasure, including 
many painful things—tonsillectomies, for instance—have value. They insist, however, that such 
things have only extrinsic value, that pleasure alone has intrinsic value. A tonsillectomy has 
value because it contributes to the absence of pain, which is a species or element of pleasure.  
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C. Arguments for Axiological Hedonism 
 
The following four arguments are typical of those used by axiological hedonists. They are 
arranged in order of increasing plausibility.  
 
First Argument for Axiological Hedonism (adapted from Bentham):  
 
(1) The words “good” and “pleasurable” are synonymous; thus, the statement “Pleasure, 
and pleasure alone, is intrinsically good” means the same as “Pleasure, and pleasure 
alone, is intrinsically pleasurable.”  
 
(2) Obviously, the only intrinsically pleasurable thing is pleasure itself. In other words, 
pleasure, and pleasure alone, is intrinsically pleasurable. 
 
(3) Therefore, pleasure, and pleasure alone, is intrinsically good. 
 
This argument fails because its first premise is false. The word “good” does not mean 
“pleasurable.” Nor does it mean “productive of pleasure.” Those who say “Fairness is good, even 
when it produces no pleasure” are not guilty of a contradiction or a misuse of language. Perhaps 
they are guilty of an error, but that’s a different point. 
 
Second Argument for Axiological Hedonism (adapted from J. S. Mill’s Utilitarianism): 
 
(1) Happiness is the only thing that people desire for its own sake.  
 
(2) If happiness is the only thing that people desire for its own sake, then we have 
sufficient proof that happiness is the only thing capable of being desired for its own 
sake.  
 
(3) “Capable of being desired” means the same as “desirable.” Hence, rather than saying 
that happiness is the only thing capable of being desired for its own sake, we can say 
that happiness is the only thing that is desirable for its own sake. This in turn means 
that happiness is the only thing that is intrinsically desirable.  
 
(4) “Desirable” and “good” are interchangeable. Thus, rather than saying that happiness is 
the only thing that is intrinsically desirable, we can say that happiness is the only thing 
that is intrinsically good.  
 
(5) Therefore (from (1) through (4)), happiness is the only thing that is intrinsically good.  
 
(6) Happiness is nothing other than pleasure.  
 
(7) Therefore (from (5) and (6)), pleasure is the only thing that is intrinsically good.  
 
This argument contains at least two doubtful premises: the first and the sixth. Even if we 
ignore those premises, the argument contains falsehoods unless “desirable” has a different 
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meaning in the fourth premise than it has in the third. In premise (3) it means “capable of being 
desired.” However, in (4) it means “worthy of being desired”; otherwise it is not interchangeable 
with “good.” But if “desirable” has a different meaning in (4) than it has in (3), the argument is 
invalid. 
 
Third Argument for Axiological Hedonism (based on a second, more charitable, look at Mill’s 
Utilitarianism):  
 
(1) Happiness is the only thing that people desire for its own sake.  
 
(2) Although principles about what is (or is not) intrinsically good cannot be proved in a 
strict sense, they can be shown to be reasonably acceptable, meaning acceptable to 
reasonable and honest people. It is reasonable to accept the principle “X is intrinsically 
good” if and only if we sincerely desire X for its own sake.  
 
(3) Thus, given (1) and (2), it is reasonable to accept the principle that happiness is 
intrinsically good; it is not reasonable to accept the claim that things other than 
happiness are intrinsically good. In short, it is reasonable to accept this assertion: 
“Happiness is the only thing that is intrinsically good.”  
 
(4) Happiness is nothing other than pleasure. 
 
(5) Therefore, given (3) and (4), it is reasonable to accept the principle “Pleasure is the 
only thing that is intrinsically good.” 
 
This argument does not equivocate on any key terms; in that sense it improves on the 
argument that precedes it. However, it contains at least two questionable premises: (1) and (4).  
 
Fourth Argument for Axiological Hedonism (attributable to Ralph M. Blake [1889–1950]): 
 
(1) Surely some pleasures are intrinsically good. Or if “surely” is too strong a word here, at 
least this is true: Some pleasures appear, upon reflection, to be intrinsically good, and 
we have no reason to think that appearances deceive us here.  
 
(2) It is plausible to think this: We can account for the apparent lack of goodness in some 
pleasures without denying that they have intrinsic goodness. It is plausible to think this 
because we find upon reflection that whenever a pleasure appears to lack value, this 
appearance changes if we carefully abstract the pleasure from its origins, effects, and 
accompaniments. For instance, sadistic pleasure seems to lack value, but when we 
isolate such pleasure from everything that usually goes with it, including the sadistic 
deeds to which it is connected, it then seems to have value. The evil that seemed to 
reside in the pleasure drops aside in the process of abstraction, because it actually 
resides not in the pleasure itself but in things that produce, result from, or otherwise 
relate to the pleasure.  
 
(3) It is also plausible to think this: We can account for the value of things other than 
pleasure (truth and beauty, for instance) without assuming that things other than 
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pleasure have intrinsic value. It is plausible to think this because we find upon 
reflection that whenever a thing other than pleasure appears to be valuable, this 
appearance fades when we carefully abstract the thing from the pleasures that 
accompany or result from it. For instance, beauty appears to have value, but this 
appearance entirely fades when we consider beauty itself, in abstraction from every 
pleasure—past, present, and future—that might accompany or result from beauty. The 
value that seemed to reside in beauty actually resides elsewhere: in the pleasures to 
which beauty contributes.  
 
(4) Given (1) through (3), it is reasonable to conclude that every pleasure, and nothing but 
pleasure, is intrinsically valuable.  
 
Although this argument is stronger than the previous three, its second two steps are disputa-
ble. Together, they essentially say that reflection supports axiological hedonism, where “reflec-
tion” refers to thought experiments about pleasure and value. Whether such thought experiments 
make axiological hedonism plausible depends on the particular person doing the experiments; 
thus, the fourth argument for axiological hedonism falls short of establishing its conclusion. By 
the same token, anti-hedonistic arguments that rest on thought experiments do not disprove 
axiological hedonism. This is one of the key points made by proponents of the fourth argument. 
 
D. Problems and Questions for Axiological Hedonists 
 
I will mention four of these. The first problem, obviously, is that of producing a compelling 
argument for axiological hedonism, an argument that can persuade nonhedonists. No one has 
done so, but axiological hedonism has a surface plausibility that invites further attempts. The 
second problem is that of establishing the reality of intrinsic, as opposed to merely extrinsic, 
value. Some philosophers, including John Dewey (1859–1952), Sidney Hook (1902–1989), and 
Monroe Beardsley (1915–1985), have argued that all value is extrinsic, that nothing has value in 
abstraction from everything else. The third problem is that of quantifying pleasures. The 
question, Can pleasure be quantified, and if so, how?, has produced plenty of thought but little 
consensus, even among quantitative hedonists. 
Before considering the fourth problem let us note that we should not overestimate the third 
problem. Even if we cannot quantify pleasure and thereby determine whether one pleasurable 
thing is, say, exactly twice as pleasurable as another, we often can compare the two things and 
see that one of them is more pleasurable than the other. Comparison does not always require 
quantification or the use of a calculus.  
Just as we should not overestimate the third problem, we should not underestimate it by 
thinking that we can easily solve it by embracing qualitative hedonism. Qualitative hedonists do 
not deny that the intrinsic value of a pleasure varies with its quantity; their point is simply that 
quality enters the picture as well. Also, qualitative hedonism has problems of its own. For 
example, E. F. Carritt (1876–1964) compares the qualitative hedonist to the person who says that 
although he values nothing but money, he would not come by it dishonestly. Such a person 
clearly values honesty as well as money. Likewise, Carritt contends, if a person says that given 
two pleasures of the same quantity, the one with the higher quality is the more intrinsically 
valuable of the two, that person implies that pleasure is not the sole thing of intrinsic value.  
The fourth problem is that of answering the question, What exactly is pleasure? This 
problem is complicated by the hedonist’s use of “pleasure” so that it extends not only to pleasure 
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as it is usually conceived, but also to something quite different, namely, the absence of pain. That 
these two things differ, that pleasure and pain are not on par like east and west, is reflected in 
ordinary language. It makes sense to say “I’m in pain,” which invites the question “Where does it 
hurt?” However, it makes no sense to say “I’m in pleasure”; the appropriate expression is “I’m 
experiencing pleasure” or “I find this to be pleasant.” And neither of those statements invites the 
question “Where does it feel good?” A person who takes pleasure in skydiving cannot locate the 
pleasure in question, indicating that pleasure either is not simply a feeling, or is not a feeling on 
par with pain.  
A natural reply here is that we can revise axiological hedonism as follows: 
 
Exactly two things are intrinsically good, neither of which reduces to the other. The first is 
pleasure, whatever its kind or source; the second is the absence of pain.  
 
This thesis avoids the charge that it puts pleasure and pain on par. The problem, however, is 
that it makes axiological hedonism a pluralistic, rather than a monistic, theory of intrinsic value. 
This is a problem because most axiological hedonists see monism not only as a key element of 
their theory but as one of its greatest advantages. If we can account for all value in terms of just 
one thing of intrinsic value, then we can easily compare the values of widely different 
experiences—or so it is natural to think. However, comparisons become difficult if two or more 
incommensurable things have intrinsic value.  
 
IV. PSYCHOLOGICAL HEDONISM 
 
A. The Thesis of Psychological Hedonism 
 
The term “psychological hedonism” traditionally refers to the view that every act is motivated, 
ultimately, by the agent’s desire for his own pleasure (where pleasure is taken to include the 
absence of pain). I say “traditionally” rather than “always” because the term sometimes extends 
not only to the view just stated but also to various others. An example is genetic hedonism, the 
view that each of our present desires arose originally from our desire for pleasure. This view 
differs from the initial one. Genetic hedonists can admit that many of our desires are neither 
egoistic nor concerned with pleasure. Genetic hedonism is specifically about the origin of 
desires, not about their objects or content.  
From here forward, “psychological hedonism” has its traditional meaning. It refers to this 
thesis: 
 
Human beings are so constituted that the sole ultimate motive of every purposive human act 
is the agent’s desire for pleasure—specifically, her own pleasure. 
 
Psychological hedonism is a version of the following thesis, known as psychological 
egoism: 
 
Human beings are so constituted that the sole ultimate motive of every purposive human act 
is a self-interested desire—for instance, a desire for the agent’s own survival or for his own 
pleasure. In short, everyone is actuated, ultimately, by nothing but self-interest.  
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Let us note that psychological hedonism implies none of the following: (i) people do 
nothing that benefits others; (ii) people receive no pleasure from benefiting others; (iii) people 
desire nothing but pleasure; and (iv) people are aware that their deeds spring ultimately from a 
desire for pleasure. Psychological hedonism does not imply (i) or (ii) because although it says 
that our ultimate goal is pleasure, it says nothing about how we try to further that goal or about 
what brings us pleasure. No doubt some people receive pleasure from helping others. Psycholog-
ical hedonism does not imply (iii) because it accommodates the fact that people have subordinate 
(as opposed to ultimate) desires for things besides pleasure. Perhaps Beth wants to help Seth, but 
it’s also true (according to psychological hedonists) that if Beth were perfectly insightful about 
her motives she would see that she wants to help Seth as a means of obtaining pleasure. Her 
desire to help Seth is subordinate to her desire for pleasure, the latter being her only nonsubordi-
nate, or ultimate, desire. Finally, psychological hedonism does not imply (iv) because it 
accommodates the view that people often deceive themselves about their ultimate desires.  
 
B. Arguments for Psychological Hedonism 
 
Although psychological hedonism is attractive to many people, it is hard to establish. There are 
two common arguments for it, neither of which succeeds.  
 
First Argument for Psychological Hedonism: Each of our actions comes with at least a 
slight amount of pleasure. That is, whenever we successfully complete an act we obtain 
some pleasure. Hence, it is reasonable to think that our ultimate goal in acting is to obtain 
pleasure.  
 
Second Argument for Psychological Hedonism: Psychological egoism is true, and psycho-
logical hedonism is the most plausible form of psychological egoism. Hence, we should 
accept psychological hedonism.  
 
The first argument fails because its premise is false. Contrary to that premise, I do not 
always receive pleasure from a successfully performed action. Instead, I receive some desire-
satisfaction. Owing to this, it is easy to think that I myself receive some satisfaction, meaning 
that I receive some pleasure. But there is a confusion here between two different things: 
satisfying a desire; and satisfying the person who has the desire. To satisfy a desire—to “receive 
some desire-satisfaction”—I need only bring about the state of affairs my desire has as its object. 
For instance, if I want to die by electrocution, or more precisely, if I want it to be the case that I 
die by electrocution, my desire will be satisfied if that state of affairs is brought about. However, 
I will experience no pleasure when that happens.  
Even if the premise were true it would not support psychological hedonism. The premise 
says that whenever I complete an action I receive some pleasure. This does not imply that 
whenever I perform an action, I do so to receive pleasure. Think of it this way: Whenever James 
goes home for a visit he receives a lecture from his mother (on why it’s important to attend 
church on Sunday and to brush his teeth regularly). This does not imply that whenever James 
goes home for a visit he does so to receive a lecture from his mother.  
Let us examine the second argument for psychological hedonism. The problem with it is that 
its first premise—that psychological egoism is true—is highly questionable. Not one of the usual 
arguments for it succeeds. Here are those arguments:  
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First Argument for Psychological Egoism: If we reject psychological egoism we must 
accept psychological altruism, which is a naïve, unrealistic theory of human nature. If we 
are not self-deceptive, if we accept reality, we must grant that people are not angels—and 
that means accepting egoism. 
 
Second Argument for Psychological Egoism: Every student of economics knows that 
(rational) people are expected utility-maximizers: they behave in ways that maximize 
expected utility—specifically, their own expected utility. This means that people are 
egoistic. In other words, to deny psychological egoism is to deny that people are utility 
maximizers, which is to deny a key assumption of economics. To do this is grossly 
unscientific. Thus, if we are scientifically minded we will accept psychological egoism. 
 
Third Argument for Psychological Egoism: Even if we have fundamental desires for the 
survival, well-being, and so on, of other people, those desires exist only because they benefit 
our genes. (In this respect they are no different from our other fundamental desires.) Owing 
to those desires, we often act in ways that help other people, thereby inclining those people 
to reciprocate our actions. This means that those people are disposed to feed us when we are 
starving, rescue us when we are drowning, and so on. This contributes to our survival and 
well-being, and thus increases our potential to leave offspring. And this, in turn, furthers the 
replication our genes, including the genes that account for our desires for the survival and 
well-being of others. In other words, it increases the chances that those genes will copy 
themselves into future generations. This sort of thing has been going on for millions of 
years, and accounts for the fact that we have fundamental desires for the survival, well-
being, and so forth of other people. But of course if this is why we have those desires, then 
the deeds that result from them (as well as the desires themselves) are not truly unselfish. 
After all, if what explains an action is that it ultimately issues from a desire, where that 
desire exists only because it serves our own genes, then the action is selfish, despite any 
appearance to the contrary. Thus, our actions are fundamentally selfish. 
 
Fourth Argument for Psychological Egoism: Whenever a person acts, her act springs from a 
desire. But whose desire? A desire of her own, of course. For example, if she gives to 
charity, she does so because she herself wants to; her deed is in the service of one of her 
own desires. Thus, at bottom, she is always looking out for herself. In sum, people are 
always acting selfishly, even when they seem to be doing otherwise. 
 
The problem with the first of these arguments is that the antithesis of psychological egoism 
is not altruism, but simply nonegoism. Nonegoism asserts that some of our deeds ultimately 
derive from nonselfish desires, meaning desires that are not for our own pleasure, our own 
survival, and so on. One way to establish nonegoism would be to show that people sometimes act 
maliciously. That is, they act from a desire to hurt others, and not simply as a means of satisfying 
a more basic, self-directed desire. The ultimate aim of a genuinely malicious deed is the injury of 
another person. If such deeds occur, psychological egoism is false. 
The second argument misunderstands the notion of utility. When economists say that people 
are utility-maximizers they do not mean that there is an obtainable thing or feeling called 
“utility,” and that a rational person strives for as much of it as possible. They mean, roughly, that 
people act according to their preferences, and preferences can be numerically measured. This is 
where utility (as economists understand it) enters the picture. Utility is a measure of preference: 
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one thing has a higher utility than another if the relevant person prefers it to the other. Hence, 
when economists say that people are utility-maximizers they mean, roughly, that people do what 
they most prefer to do. This is consistent with the view that many fundamental preferences are 
unselfish.  
To see the flaws in the third argument for psychological egoism, consider the premise 
expressed in its penultimate two sentences. The gist of that premise is that if a desire exists only 
because the acts that ultimately spring from it further the replication of the agent’s genes, then 
those acts are selfish. This premise could mean either of two things:  
 
(A) If a desire exists only because the acts that ultimately spring from it further the replica-
tion of the agent’s genes, then those acts are “selfish” in this sense: they ultimately 
spring from a desire that has as its object the agent’s own survival, or the agent’s own 
pleasure, or the agent’s own gene-reproduction, etc.  
 
(A´) If a desire exists only because the acts that ultimately spring from it further the replica-
tion of the agent’s genes, then those acts are “selfish” in this sense: they ultimately 
spring from a desire which, via the acts that ultimately spring from it, furthers the 
replication of the agent’s own genes.  
 
Proposition (A) is clearly false. From the fact that a desire exists only because it contributes 
to a particular consequence (e.g., the replication of the agent’s genes), it does not follow that the 
object of the desire is that consequence. The object of a desire is one thing; what maintains the 
existence of the desire is another.  
Thus, the premise we are examining, if it is not clearly false, is equivalent to (A´). But then 
the third argument for psychological egoism fails. To see this, note that the conclusion of that 
argument—that our actions are fundamentally selfish—could mean either of the following:  
 
(B) Every act is motivated, ultimately, by a desire that has as its object the agent’s own 
survival, or the agent’s own pleasure, or the agent’s own gene-reproduction, etc.  
 
(B´) Every act is motivated, ultimately, by a desire that serves the agent’s own genes—i.e., 
a desire which, via the acts that ultimately spring from it, furthers the replication of 
those genes. 
 
If the conclusion of the third argument is short for (B), the argument fails to support its 
conclusion. Premise (A´) fails to support (B) even when combined with the further, two-part 
premise that (i) every act ultimately springs from a desire and (ii) every desire exists only 
because the acts that ultimately spring from it further the replication of the agent’s genes. From 
(A´) and this supplementary premise it follows, not that (B) is true, but that every act ultimately 
springs from a desire which, via the acts that ultimately spring from it, furthers the replication of 
the agent’s own genes. This, in essence, is proposition (B´), not (B).  
However, if the conclusion of the third argument is short for (B´) rather than (B), then even 
if the argument is sound it does not support psychological egoism. Proposition (B´), far from 
asserting psychological egoism, is compatible with nonegoism. From the fact, if it is a fact, that 
the ultimate source of any action is a desire that furthers the replication of the agent’s own genes, 
nothing follows about the propositional content of that desire—that is, about what the desire has 
as its object. For all we know, its object could be the well-being of another person, in which case 
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psychological egoism is false. To oppose this observation by insisting that the desire would not 
exist unless it contributed to the replication of the agent’s own genes is simply to miss the point. 
The point is that psychological egoism and its antithesis, nonegoism, are not about what explains 
the existence of the desires at the root of our actions. They are about the content of those desires, 
about the states of affairs those desires have as their objects. Psychological egoism asserts, and 
nonegoism denies, that those desires are always self-directed, that they have as their object 
nothing but, say, the agent’s own pleasure or survival. Statement (B´) does not imply this thesis; 
hence, to defend (B´) is not to support psychological egoism.  
Let us examine the fourth argument for psychological egoism. Its conclusion, that people 
always act selfishly, could mean either that (a) everyone always acts from a selfish desire, or that 
(b) everyone always acts from a desire of her own.  
If we read the conclusion as (a), the argument is invalid. The fact that each of my acts 
springs from one of my own desires, meaning a desire that belongs to me, does not imply that 
every such act springs from a selfish desire—for instance, a desire for my own pleasure. Perhaps 
I have desires for the misery or happiness of others, and such desires cause much of my 
behavior. This comports with the claim that I always act from a desire of my own. The general 
point is that from the fact that my deeds spring from my own desires, nothing follows about the 
objects of those desires, and hence about the aims of my actions.  
Perhaps we should read the conclusion of the argument as (b). This makes the argument 
valid, for its conclusion now merely restates its key premise. However, the argument is no better 
than before, for its conclusion no longer warrants the name “egoism.” It is now compatible with 
the claim that people sometimes act from nonselfish desires, which is the thesis of nonegoism. 
That is, to read the conclusion as (b) is to allow the possibility that although people always act 
from their own desires, many of their ultimate desires have as their object something other than 
the agent’s own pleasure, survival, or the like.  
In response to this objection, it will not do to redefine psychological egoism as position (b), 
the view that everyone always acts from a desire of her own. Such a response merely stretches 
the term “psychological egoism” so that it extends to virtually every view of human motivation, 
including the one known as nonegoism. It amounts to ignoring the contrast between egoism and 
nonegoism, which is very different from refuting, or even challenging, nonegoism.  
We have been considering the second argument for psychological hedonism, a premise of 
which is that psychological egoism is true. We have considered four arguments for that premise, 
none of which succeeds. Unless better arguments exist, psychological egoism lacks support, and 
hence the second argument for psychological hedonism, like the first, is no good.  
 
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR APPLIED ETHICS 
 
Axiological hedonism clearly has implications for applied ethics. Indeed, so numerous are those 
implications that it is difficult even to begin listing them. For example, many familiar moral 
arguments about abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment, and health care policy rest partly on a 
rejection of axiological hedonism. That is, they rest on the assumption that one or more things 
besides pleasure, particularly human life, have intrinsic value. These arguments are unsound if 
axiological hedonism it true. 
Psychological hedonism is relevant to applied ethics owing to its possible implication that 
truly moral behavior never occurs. I say “possible implication” because whether psychological 
hedonism actually has this implication depends on the essential elements of moral behavior, and 
on that topic there is much debate. However, many would agree that moral behavior essentially 
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involves acting, at least sometimes, from fundamental motives that are not self-interested. If, as 
psychological hedonism implies, human nature is such that acting from such motives never 
occurs, then there is no point in encouraging such behavior. Similarly, if, as psychological 
hedonism implies, it is not psychologically possible for Alf to do his part in preserving the 
environment, alleviating world hunger, and so forth except insofar as he sees such behavior as a 
means to his own pleasure, then there is no point in trying to persuade Alf to do those things. At 
least, there is no point in trying this except through arguments to the effect that such deeds will 
bring Alf pleasure. Unfortunately, such arguments may not be available or successful.  
In short, if psychological hedonism (or more generally, psychological egoism) is true, then 
some of the things that (some) applied ethicists do are pointless. Perhaps it is fortunate, then, that 
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